Could China Become the World’s Leading Power? An Analysis of Rise and Governance
- Admin
- May 12
- 20 min read
China’s Economic and Technological Ascent
China’s economic transformation over the past four decades has been unprecedented in pace and scale. In 1978, at the start of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, China was among the poorest countries in the world. Since then, the country’s GDP has grown at an average exceeding 8% per year, lifting its per capita income from a tiny fraction of U.S. levels to a significant share. By around 2010, China had emerged as the world’s second-largest economy, and today it accounts for roughly 18% of global GDP (in nominal terms) and more than one-quarter in purchasing-power parity terms. As one economic analysis noted, “the pace and scale of China’s economic transformation have no historical precedent”. Indeed, this growth has raised hundreds of millions out of poverty – over the past 40 years, nearly 800 million Chinese people escaped extreme poverty, representing more than 75% of all global poverty reduction in that period. Such figures testify to the staggering impact of China’s rise on human welfare and the world economy.
Equally striking is China’s drive for technological leadership. Once known primarily as a low-cost manufacturing hub, China has rapidly climbed the value chain into advanced industries. Its companies and research institutes are now at the cutting edge of 5G telecommunications, artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, biotechnology, and green energy. A 2018 report from the Mercator Institute for China Studies observed that “from 5G networks to blockchain and electric vehicles: China has caught up to the forefront of new technologies that are based on artificial intelligence”. Chinese tech giants like Huawei, Alibaba, Tencent, and newer AI firms enjoy massive state support and benefit from the sheer scale of China’s market and data – e.g. over 800 million internet users generating big data to train algorithms. China’s annual investment in research and development (R&D) now ranks second only to the United States, reaching about 2.5% of GDP (over $300 billion) in recent years. Former Google CEO Eric Schmidt warned that China could even overtake the U.S. in AI by the 2020s if current trends continue, pointedly noting “these Chinese people are good” in reference to China’s determined push in frontier tech.
By traditional metrics of national power, China is already a heavyweight. It is the world’s largest trading nation and energy consumer, and the leading exporter of manufactured goods. It has amassed foreign exchange reserves around $3 trillion and has become a major source of foreign investment and development loans. As a Brookings Institution summary put it, “The United States and China are now the world’s clear number one and number two in economic scale, energy consumption, carbon emissions, military spending, and technology”, far ahead of any other country. This dominance across multiple domains underscores that China’s rise is broad-based. Georgetown professor Graham Allison encapsulates the moment by noting that “never before in history has a rising power ascended so far, so fast, on so many different dimensions.”
Yet economic size alone does not equate to global leadership, and China’s growth faces headwinds. After decades of double-digit GDP expansion, China’s economy has begun to slow to more modest rates. Structural challenges – an aging population, high local debt burdens, environmental strains, and the middle-income trap – threaten to curb its momentum. The 2020s have seen debates on whether China might be nearing its economic peak. Some economists once predicted China would overtake the U.S. as the largest economy by 2028 or 2030, but more recent assessments have pushed that date further out or doubt it will happen at all. A 2024 analysis from the Council on Foreign Relations notes that even assuming a healthy 5% growth rate, China “might not overtake the United States until 2035,” and some analysts “argue that China’s economy may never surpass that of the United States.”. Crucially, the quality of growth and innovation will matter as much as quantity. Here, China’s authoritarian system, which thus far has coexisted with economic dynamism, may encounter new difficulties – a theme we will explore below. For now, China’s economic and technological ascent has set the stage for its bid for leading-power status, providing the material foundation on which influence is built.
Military Modernization and Geopolitical Influence
Parallel to its economic rise, China has undertaken a sweeping military modernization program aiming to transform the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a “world-class” force by mid-century. Defense spending has surged annually for decades. In 2024, China’s official military budget reached an estimated $314 billion (USD) – making it the world’s second largest military spender after the U.S.. This marks roughly a 7% increase over the previous year and continues an unbroken 30-year streak of rising defense outlays. By some measures, the PLA Navy now possesses the world’s largest fleet of warships (in number, though not tonnage) and has launched advanced platforms including aircraft carriers, stealth fighter jets, and an array of ballistic and hypersonic missiles. China has also expanded its nuclear arsenal and space and cyber warfare capabilities. Beijing’s military reach, once regionally confined, is increasingly global: in 2017 it established its first overseas base in Djibouti, and it regularly conducts naval patrols in the Indian Ocean and joint exercises with partners as distant as the Middle East. Analysts note that China is investing across all domains – air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace – to project power and challenge any adversary in East Asia, while also defending its growing interests abroad.
China’s geopolitical influence has expanded in tandem, through diplomacy and major economic initiatives. Most emblematic is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), unveiled by President Xi Jinping in 2013 as a global infrastructure and connectivity campaign. Through BRI, China has financed ports, railways, highways, power plants, and telecom networks across Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America – over $670 billion invested in nearly 150 countries from 2013 to 2022. This massive spending spree has boosted China’s sway in developing regions, earning goodwill by addressing infrastructure gaps, but also binding many countries into economic dependence. A U.S. government analysis describes China as “the world’s largest investor in other countries,” using such projects to “expand its influence globally”. At times, partner nations have incurred unsustainable debts and political obligations in the process, leading critics to warn of “debt-trap diplomacy.” Beijing, for its part, touts BRI as a win-win development scheme, but it clearly doubles as a strategic tool to secure China’s access to resources, new markets, and supportive votes in international forums.
In addition to infrastructure diplomacy, China has become more assertive in multilateral institutions and regional affairs. It holds leadership positions in bodies like the United Nations (e.g. heads of several UN agencies are Chinese nationals) and uses forums such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS to promote agendas not set by Western powers. China often emphasizes state sovereignty and non-interference in global norms – a stance that appeals to many authoritarian or non-Western governments. At the same time, Beijing has worked to undermine certain liberal norms, particularly regarding human rights and internet governance. As a Council on Foreign Relations study observes, China supports the existing international system when it aligns with Chinese interests (for instance, backing UN peacekeeping or climate agreements), but “on issues in which Beijing diverges from the norms of the current system, such as human rights, it seeks to undermine those values and create alternative institutions and models.”. Notably, China has cooperated with Russia and others to champion a conception of “cyber sovereignty” and dilute human-rights scrutiny, creating, in effect, competing blocs of norms. This approach “appears to be deepening divides with other countries, particularly democracies… [and] could even create two distinct systems of global governance” if it continues.
China’s expanding influence is evident in concrete diplomatic outcomes. Beijing has brokered deals (for example, helping mediate a rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023), increased its foreign aid and media footprint, and advanced trade pacts like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in Asia. However, soft power – the ability to attract and persuade – remains a relative weakness for China’s global leadership bid. Despite heavy investment in cultural diplomacy (Confucius Institutes, global media like CGTN, mega-events like the Olympics), China’s international image often suffers due to its authoritarian politics and aggressive moves. As Professor Joseph Nye, who coined the term soft power, points out, China’s domestic repression and assertiveness tend to “limit its soft power” in democratic societies. Nye recounted that a high-ranking Chinese official once asked him how China could improve its soft power; Nye’s advice was that Beijing first resolve its disputes with neighbors and improve its behavior, since “it doesn’t do you any good to create a Confucius Institute in New Delhi if [at the same time] Chinese soldiers are killing Indian soldiers on the border.” The implication is that military and economic might alone won’t make China a widely respected leader unless accompanied by restraint, rule-based conduct, and values that others find appealing.
Ultimately, could China become the dominant world power? Its trajectory suggests it will continue gaining influence, yet it also faces balancing forces. The United States retains a vast network of allies and partners (stretching across NATO, East Asia, etc.) that China largely lacks; democratic powers collectively still account for a majority of global GDP and military capacity. Moreover, as China rises, other major states like India, Japan, and the European Union are moving to protect their own interests, often by aligning more closely with the U.S. or each other. International relations scholars note we are entering an era of intense U.S.-China strategic competition, but not necessarily one where all others fall in line behind Beijing or Washington. Instead, many countries are engaging in a “balancing act,” hedging between the two great powers. João Macongo, an African political analyst, observes that “we are currently witnessing a new reconfiguration of global power” and warns that if regions like Africa do not strategically awaken, they risk remaining pawns with “no influence on the international stage.” His point underlines that global leadership in the 21st century may be more diffuse, and that China’s rise will encounter not just American resistance but also the agency of other nations deciding whether to embrace or resist a China-centric order.
The Chinese Communist Party’s Authoritarian Governance Model
Central to the question of China’s future status is the nature of its governance model. China is ruled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which has maintained an unbroken monopoly on political power since 1949. The CCP oversees a highly centralized, one-party authoritarian state. Under President Xi Jinping, this system has, if anything, become more centralized and ideologically rigid – often described as a “Leninist” or neo-Stalinist model of control. What are the strengths and weaknesses of this model, especially in contrast to democratic governance?
Strengths and achievements: The CCP’s centralized governance allows for strategic long-term planning and swift policy implementation. Free from the short electoral cycles and partisan gridlock that often slow down democracies, China’s leadership can formulate ambitious national plans (such as five-year economic plans or multi-decade programs like “Made in China 2025”) and marshal vast resources to execute them. This has enabled grand infrastructure projects on an awe-inspiring scale – for example, China built a 20,000-km nationwide high-speed rail network in about a decade, an engineering feat unprecedented in modern history. The state-led model also facilitated the rapid industrialization that made China the “factory of the world,” and the mobilization of efforts that achieved public goals like mass poverty alleviation. In 2021, Xi Jinping announced that China had eradicated extreme rural poverty by its national definition, crowning a campaign that the World Bank confirms lifted hundreds of millions from destitution. The CCP regime emphasizes meritocratic promotion (at least within party ranks), technical expertise, and stability. Many officials are engineers or technocrats who approach development as a science. Observers note that this system, while repressive, has delivered basic order and steady improvements in living standards for much of the population. The regime also can respond forcefully to crises: for instance, during the COVID-19 pandemic’s early phase, China’s strict lockdowns and centralized control helped quash the virus domestically for a time (albeit through draconian means).
Internationally, some analysts argue that China’s governance model can make bold moves that democracies might shy from. One example is climate policy – China has pledged to reach carbon neutrality by 2060 and is investing more in renewable energy than any other country. A commentary in the Columbia Political Review noted that China’s one-party system, paradoxically, “places the country in a unique position to lead global sustainability efforts,” because the leadership can enforce long-range initiatives without legislative deadlock. In this view, the CCP’s authoritative control and ability to “sacrifice short-term pains for long-term gains” can be a strategic asset in addressing issues like infrastructure building or environmental targets.
However, these strengths are paired with profound weaknesses and limitations, especially when considering human rights and innovation. The authoritarian model severely restricts political freedom and individual liberties. China has no national elections for leadership, no legal opposition parties, no free press, and no independent courts that can check the Party’s actions. Dissent is ruthlessly suppressed – from the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy movement in 1989, to the more recent crackdowns on Hong Kong’s autonomy and the mass internment of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang. Freedom House consistently rates China as “Not Free”, scoring a mere 9 out of 100 on political rights and civil liberties – near the bottom of the world. Dissenting voices are censored online by the Great Firewall and squashed on the ground by an extensive security apparatus. Under Xi, surveillance has reached Orwellian levels, with technologies like facial recognition and big data used to monitor citizens. The result is a society where the government enjoys little consent of the governed in a democratic sense, but instead relies on performance-based legitimacy and coercion.
This system’s implications for China’s rise are double-edged. On one hand, tight control can maintain stability – the CCP often cites the chaotic collapse of the Soviet Union as a cautionary tale justifying its iron grip. On the other hand, lack of freedoms can stifle the very creative energies and constructive criticism that long-term economic and technological dynamism require. Innovation thrives on open inquiry, debate, and the freedom to fail or challenge orthodoxy – conditions better met in pluralistic environments than under censorship. Many scholars have argued that China’s authoritarian growth model, while effective up to a point, may hit an “institutional ceiling.” Political economists Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, in their work on why nations succeed or fail, classify China’s system as “extractive” – capable of rapid gains by mobilizing resources, but ultimately prone to stagnation without inclusive institutions (like accountable governance) to sustain innovation. As Professor Minxin Pei observes, China’s recent trajectory actually shows the regime becoming more repressive at home and aggressive abroad as it has grown richer, defying the prediction that economic development would liberalize the country. He notes that Xi Jinping’s tenure has “reverted to a neo-Stalinist path”: reviving one-man rule, escalating political repression to its worst level since Mao, and enforcing ideological conformity. This tightening may secure the CCP’s hold on power in the near term, but it also alienates educated urban citizens and ethnic minorities, and fosters corruption and policy blunders by silencing constructive feedback.
The costs of authoritarian excess have become apparent in various episodes. For example, China’s rigid zero-Covid policy (2020–2022) initially kept infections low but became economically ruinous and wildly unpopular; yet local authorities were often too fearful to adjust course until rare public protests erupted. Environmental and public-health crises (from pollution to tainted food scandals) have similarly festered when watchdogs are muzzled. Moreover, China’s image abroad suffers due to its governance: the detention of over a million Uyghurs in what researchers call “re-education camps” has been labeled a gross human-rights violation by many democracies, undermining China’s soft power. Beijing’s support for other authoritarian regimes and its “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy (blunt, nationalistic rhetoric) have further antagonized global opinion in liberal societies. All of these factors suggest that the CCP’s model, for all its efficiency, carries stability risks – an inflexibility that can lead to explosive outcomes if and when things go wrong.
Not least, an authoritarian China as world leader raises normative concerns: Would a Beijing-led order sacrifice the liberal values that have underpinned the post-World War II international system? Xi Jinping has made clear that he sees China’s system as an alternative model for development, touting what he calls “whole-process people’s democracy” (a term the CCP uses to describe its governance, despite its one-party reality). In practice, this model prioritizes state power and party control over individual rights. If such a model were to become dominant globally, principles like universal human rights, rule of law, and free speech could be eroded in international norms. Democracies worry that a Chinese superpower might reshape institutions like the UN to be less protective of civil liberties – a trend some analysts already detect. Thus, while China’s governance has delivered economic results, its ideological and moral legitimacy as a world leader is in question. As one of Macongo’s critical observations goes, a nation can become wealthy under dictatorial leadership but still “produce militants who swear allegiance to the leader while destroying their homeland” – a caution that prosperity without liberty can breed ruinous fanaticism and internal decay.
Democratic Governance as an Alternative Model
In considering an alternative to China’s authoritarian approach, it is instructive to examine the strengths of liberal democratic governance. Modern democracies vary in form, but they generally share key features that contrast sharply with one-party rule. These include constitutional rule of law, checks and balances among branches of government, regular free elections, protection of civil liberties, and a pluralistic civil society with independent media. How do these features contribute to national strength and global leadership capacity?
Democracy’s Core Features and Advantages:
Rule of Law and Accountability: In a democracy, no leader or institution is above the law. The government’s powers are constrained by laws and an independent judiciary, meaning leaders can be held accountable for corruption or abuse. This creates a system where state authority has legitimacy and citizens have legal recourse for grievances. Rule of law also provides a stable, predictable environment for economic activity (contracts enforced, property rights protected). Perhaps most importantly, it prevents the concentration of unchecked power. As political scientist João Macongo emphasizes in an African context, the solution to misrule lies in “accountability” – leaders prioritizing transparency and the public’s well-being, and rejecting corruption and self-serving politics. These principles, which he outlines in The Black Book: The Mystery of Africa’s Misfortune, are equally applicable globally: societies governed by law and accountability tend to be more resilient and earn trust, whereas authoritarian regimes often succumb to kleptocracy and public alienation.
Checks and Balances (Separation of Powers): Democratic systems distribute power across different branches (executive, legislative, judiciary) and levels (federal, state, local). This institutionalized oversight prevents any one branch from domineering – for example, a legislature can investigate or impeach a president for wrongdoing, and courts can nullify unlawful policies. The benefit of such checks is that policies receive scrutiny from multiple angles, reducing catastrophic mistakes. It also means leadership transitions can occur without systemic collapse; if one leader falters, another can lawfully replace them. By contrast, in one-party states like China, power is concentrated in a small ruling circle – if that circle makes a grave error or if leadership succession falters, the whole system is at risk. Democracies, though often slower to decide, tend to be better at self-correcting. As Francis Fukuyama notes, a healthy democracy has “self-correcting mechanisms that allow them to reform” when problems arise. The peaceful handover of power via elections is a hallmark of democratic stability (e.g. the U.S. has held regular presidential elections for over 200 years, each time renewing legitimacy), whereas authoritarian transfers of power (say, after a dictator’s death) can be fraught with uncertainty or violence.
Protection of Civil Liberties and Independent Media: Democracies enshrine rights such as freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and press. An independent media and vibrant civil society serve as watchdogs, exposing government failures or injustices. This openness might seem messy – with loud criticism, protests, and fierce public debate – but it is in fact a crucial strength. It means that governments receive feedback and can be pressured to change course before crises become dire. A free press can investigate and inform citizens of corruption or public safety issues, helping avoid disasters. Famously, Nobel laureate economist Amartya Sen argued that public discussion and accountability in democracies prevent extreme policy failures; he observed that “no famine has ever taken place in the history of the world in a functioning democracy” because democratic leaders, facing media scrutiny and elections, cannot ignore a starving populace without political consequences. In authoritarian regimes, by contrast, information is often filtered and dissent punished – problems like famine or epidemics can be covered up until they spiral out of control. Former U.S. President Barack Obama succinctly said, “We need an independent media to hold people like me to account… Power can be very destructive if it is not checked.” In essence, civil liberties empower society’s corrective forces – journalists, activists, opposition parties – to keep a nation healthy and adaptive.
Adaptability through Consent and Reform: Democratic governments derive authority (at least in theory) from the consent of the governed, expressed in genuine elections and public discourse. This provides a flexibility: policies can be reformed or leaders voted out in response to public demands, without needing a revolution. Over time, democracies have shown an ability to reform themselves internally – extending rights to marginalized groups, updating constitutions, instituting new policy directions after elections – which authoritarian systems struggle to emulate. For example, countries like South Korea and Taiwan transitioned from dictatorship to democracy in the late 20th century and experienced both economic upgrades and more sustainable governance, whereas their authoritarian predecessors had begun to stagnate. Democracy’s allowance for “course correction” is arguably a strategic advantage in a fast-changing world. It’s notable that the most enduring and globally influential powers of the last century (the United Kingdom, United States, other Western democracies, as well as Japan and India post-democratization) have all been democracies or evolving toward democracy. Their systems proved capable of weathering wars and crises while continuing innovation. Democracies also tend to attract more high-quality immigration and talent (people generally prefer to live in free societies), fueling further creativity and economic strength – a soft-power asset China lacks due to its political repression.
From a pro-democracy perspective, these features suggest that while China’s authoritarian model can accumulate power quickly, a democratic model provides more sustainable and benevolent leadership. Democracies are not without problems – they can be slow, fractious, even chaotic at times. But as Winston Churchill once wryly noted, democracy is “the worst form of government except for all those other forms that have been tried.” The deliberation and pluralism inherent in democracy act as safety valves that, over the long run, prevent extreme abuses and allow renewal. In contrast, the CCP’s system, by concentrating power and stifling dissent, risks catastrophic governance failures (because warnings are silenced) and lacks genuine legitimacy in the eyes of those who value freedom.
It is also important to stress democracy’s normative appeal. A world-leading power in the 21st century is expected not only to be strong, but to champion ideals that others aspire to. The United States (despite inconsistencies) has long promoted concepts of freedom, human rights, and rule-based order, which became pillars of the post-1945 international system. If China aspires to lead, it will be pressed on what values it brings. So far, Beijing’s message of “sovereignty and development before democracy” resonates with some governments, but many global citizens still yearn for the liberties afforded by democracy. As Macongo figuratively puts it, “Democracy should work like traffic lights, [where] at certain times, everyone should have their turn” – highlighting the principle of rotation in power and equal opportunity. This vision starkly contrasts with indefinite one-party rule. Thus, from a values standpoint, democratic governance holds a moral high ground that can inspire people across borders, something an authoritarian superpower would lack. Maintaining that moral leadership is a strategic advantage for democracies in the contest with China.
Prospects for Global Leadership in a Divided World
China’s rise has been nothing short of extraordinary. Its economic heft, technological prowess, and growing military capabilities ensure that it will play a central role in shaping the 21st-century world. Could it become the leading power, surpassing the United States in overall influence? In material terms, China is closing many gaps – it is already the leading trading partner of most countries, the largest South-South investor, and a dominant regional military force. If current trends persisted unchecked, one could envision a world by mid-century where China’s GDP is the largest, its currency and companies define global markets, and its diplomatic clout outweighs that of any other single nation.
However, as this analysis has shown, trends do not exist in a vacuum. China’s trajectory is meeting resistance and encountering inherent limitations, many of which stem from its governance model. The United States and its allies are revitalizing alliances (from the Quad in Asia to NATO) explicitly to counter China’s influence and present a unified front of democracies. Other powers like India are asserting their own rise, unwilling to live in China’s shadow. Internally, China’s authoritarian approach may become a liability: slowing economic growth, an emerging middle class that chafes under lack of freedoms, and the difficulty of transitioning to an innovation-driven (rather than investment-driven) economy under tight state control could all undermine China’s bid for primacy. As one CFR analysis concluded, “when considering the vast soft power and geopolitical advantages the United States holds over China, it appears unlikely that China will displace the United States as a leading global power in the foreseeable future.” Even a prominent Chinese scholar, Prof. Yan Xuetong of Tsinghua University, has cautioned that many have overestimated China’s rise; he predicts that “over the next 10 years, the strength gap between China and the US might not narrow but rather widen,” calling notions of imminent Chinese supremacy “wishful thinking”.
Beyond the power metrics lies the ideological contest. The competition between China and the West is frequently framed as a competition between authoritarianism and democracy. In this realm, democracies possess a critical edge: legitimacy in the eyes of free peoples. A Chinese superpower that does not embrace political reform would find itself leading by might, not by admiration. It could end up feared but not respected, able to coax or coerce smaller states but not genuinely lead a willing coalition on global challenges like climate change or human rights. By contrast, a community of democracies, for all its imperfections, offers a vision of shared governance and respect for individuals that has proven broadly attractive since the mid-20th century. As Macongo writes, “time is the master of destiny,” and if one empire falls, another will rise to take its place. But what kind of empire? If it is one that rules by oppression and surveillance, the world may see more conflict and pushback; if it is one that embodies democratic inclusion, the prospects for a cooperative global order are brighter.
From a pro-democracy standpoint, the rise of China is a call not to confrontation alone, but to renewal of democratic institutions. The challenge China poses – economic and strategic – has already spurred many democracies to invest in innovation, strengthen alliances, and reckon with their own domestic weaknesses (such as political polarization or inequality) so as to better compete. In the long run, the surest way to prevent authoritarian dominance is to “get our own house in order,” fortifying the rule of law, civil liberties, and good governance at home and abroad. As Larry Diamond and other scholars urge, democracies must demonstrate that they can deliver prosperity and freedom, undercutting the narrative that autocracy is more effective. In international institutions, democratic states can coordinate to ensure that universal human rights and rules are upheld, even as China attempts to bend norms to favor state control.
In summary, could China become the world’s leading power? It could, in the sense that its sheer scale and momentum might elevate it to a co-equal status with the United States in coming years. But will it lead in the deeper sense – setting the tone for global norms and commanding broad-based allegiance? That remains doubtful unless significant changes occur. The strengths of China’s model in mobilizing power are offset by its failure to inspire, and by internal fragilities that may grow. Meanwhile, democratic governance, though challenged, offers an adaptable and ultimately more sustainable path to leadership. History shows that the durability of a great power often hinges on moral leadership and alliances as much as on GDP. The United States and other democracies, if they reinforce their values, are likely to maintain a systemic advantage. As the world watches this unfolding power saga, the outcome may well hinge on an oft-forgotten factor: which governance model best unlocks the creativity, trust, and cooperation of human societies. On that front, the evidence still favors democracy over authoritarianism. The task for democracies is to live up to their ideals. If they do so, China’s rise, while formidable, need not spell the end of a free and open international order – rather, it can be managed through strength and principle, ensuring that the future of global leadership remains anchored in the values of liberty and law.
Sources:
Bruce Jones, “China and the return of great power strategic competition,” Brookings Institution (2020).
Emilie Kimball et al., “Balancing act: Major powers and the global response to US–China great power competition,” Brookings (2020).
Xiaodong Zhu, “Understanding China’s Growth: Past, Present, and Future,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 26(4) (2012): 103–124.
World Bank Press Release, “Lifting 800 Million People Out of Poverty – New Report Looks at Lessons from China’s Experience” (Apr. 1, 2022).
MERICS, “China’s way to an innovation superpower” (Mar. 27, 2018).
SIPRI Fact Sheet, “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2024” (April 2025).
U.S. GAO, “China’s Foreign Investments Significantly Outpace the United States” (Oct. 16, 2024).
Council on Foreign Relations, “China’s Approach to Global Governance” (2022).
Joseph S. Nye, interview in Harvard Kennedy School PolicyCast (Apr. 2025).
João Macongo official website (quotes on global power shift and democracy).
Minxin Pei, “Totalitarianism’s Long Shadow,” Journal of Democracy 31:1 (2020).
Yan Xuetong remarks in South China Morning Post (Jan. 17, 2024).
Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (1999), quoted in Development Education Review.
Barack Obama, press conference quote on independent media (2017).
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